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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
V.

No. 950531-CA

ROBERT G. JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
Argument:

1)

In the Statement of the Case section of

the answering brief Ass't AG Beadles states,
"Defendant . . . told potential investors that they would
get back twice their investment (R. 44). He further
informed the potential investors that the scheme was a
"sure thing." (id.).
Beadles takes from the Affidavit of Probable Cause, r. 35-50,
not from the transcript of trial testimony.

The evidence at

trial is to the contrary, i.e., defendant Johnson made no such
representations nor did he "t[ell]ff or "inform[]" potential
investors.
2)

In the Summary of the Argument section of the

answering brief Beadles states,
"The term "investment contract" has been defined by Utah
case law since 1983 and federal cases since 1946. Its
meaning is not vague; rather it has been settled for
1

decades."
The cases (Utah's Payable Accounting and US Supreme Court's
Howey) upon which Beadles relies are civil.

In State v.

Pickus, 257 NW 284, 295 (S.D. 1934) the court stated,
" . . . whatever the courts may have seen fit to do in the
field of civil liability for [securities violations] the
situation with reference to criminal liability for
[securities violations] must be governed and controlled
by our statute. . . . [I]f a man] is to be criminally
held it must be by legislative act and not by judicial
decision. [The term "investment contract"] in our
criminal statute has [no] well-recognized meaning. . .
. It cannot and should not be stretched by judicial
decision.
" . . . the Legislature has not [defined "investment
contract" in the criminal statute]; and where the
Legislature has not the court cannot."
Further on in his argument summary Beadles states,
"Under the doctrine of "stare decisis," which obligates
courts to follow the decisions of higher courts, this
Court cannot declare the Utah Supreme Court's definition
of "investment contract" void. Therefore, defendant's
request for that relief should be denied."
Defendant has not asked the Court to "declare the Utah Supreme
Court's definition of "investment contract" void;" he asks
only that the statute, applied criminally against him, and
containing the term "investment contract," the particular
security the state claims was involved in the charges made
against him, be declared unconstitutionally vague "as applied"
to him.
Even further on in the summary of argument section of the
2

answering brief Beadles states,
"Defendant stipulated that the investments were
securities. Given that stipulation, the trial court's
admission of expert testimony regarding the status of
the transactions as investment contracts, and therefore,
securities, was harmless even if error.11
Defendant did not so stipulate. But Beadles' claim does bring
us directly to the core mischief in this prosecution, i.e.,
there is no investment contract and no security otherwise is
present and therefore there can be no securities violation to
prosecute.

There was, therefore, no probable cause to

commence or continue this prosecution.

From the record it

can only be inferred that the trial judge sensed this. In the
colloquy at r. 1335-1336, the trial judge, now retired, stated
to defendant's counsel in the first trial,
11

. . .and this ends the question of whether or not you
[the prosecution] have to bring in experts in on
security. [To Mr. Bottum, now deceased, defendant's
counsel in the first trial]
It's admitted it's a
security?
"MR. BOTTUM: Yes."
There

was

no

reason

whatever,

from

the

trial

court's

standpoint, or the defendant's, that such a stipulation should
be sought or that the defendant's counsel should stipulate to
have defendant waive the requirement that the state prove
beyond a reasonable doubt every
charged,

especially

the

core
3

element of the offense

element

in

a

securities

violations criminal case, the presence of a security.
But in this rarest of cases, the stipulation was sought
by the trial judge, and acceded to by defendant's counsel, in
the most extremely coercive circumstances possible for a
defense attorney, i.e., Bottum had been implicated in the same
charges on which defendant was being tried and he himself
suffered the threat of prosecution on those charges if he did
not cooperate with the trial judge and prosecution in assuring
defendant's conviction, which, of course, came about. And the
trial judge, as well as the prosecution, fraudulently and
deceptively, instructed the jury

fl

[y]ou are instructed that

the Defendant and his counsel stipulate and agree . . ." r.
562.

The state's retort is that the statute had run and

therefore attorney Bottum could not be charged at the time of
the offending stipulation. Defendant knows that the deal was
made long before the first trial between Bottum and Attorney
General Van Dam, personally.
But all this happened before, and related to, the first
trial.

In the second go-around there was no stipulation and

no instruction as Beadles claims. Facilitated by the bizarre
doings of trial judge Lyon, defendant was convicted on all
counts

and

Instructon

this
27,

appeal
which

resulted.

invokes
4

more

See,

for

instance,

than

one

statutory

alternative, each with different elements, without requiring
that the jury indicate on which of the alternatives it has
based

the defendant's guilt; and then quotes the Howey

elements of an investment contract with the relevant facts
unaddressed.
With such egregious [and criminal] conduct on the part of
the trial judge and the state's prosecutors, including Van
Dam, the Court of Appeals, on 14th Amendment Due Process
grounds,

was

required

to dismiss

prejudice, after the first trial.

the

prosecution, with

Judges Greenwood, Garff,

and Russon however, sent the matter back for a new trial
although at the time they knew, or should have known, that
there was no probable cause for the first trial.

[Opinion at

823 P.2d 494. ]
A waiver by defense counsel of defendant's right to have
the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
offense charged is ineffective without defendant's knowing
consent. This was pointed out in defendant's opening brief in
the first appeal, with authorities, at page -54-.
Then, in the final paragraph of the argument summary
section of Beadles' answering brief, the Court is urged to
"refuse to review defendant's claim of insufficiency because
he has not even attempted to marshal the evidence."

5

Defendant proceeds under the Due Process protections of
the 14th Amendment as enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (1979).

The holding there contemplates the "no

evidence" rule, in other words, as applied to this case, a
rational juror could not have found the essential element, towit, the presence of a security [investment contract] and
therefore no sale or purchase

of a security, beyond a

reasonable doubt because there is no evidence of a security in
the trial (2nd) record.

Under the Jackson standard, the

appellate court reviews the record de novo. Flieger v. Delo,
16 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1994)

Therefore, there is no evidence

in favor of a finding of "security" or "investment contract"
to marshal, and under the Jackson standard, there is no
requirement to marshal the evidence anyway, the appellate
court must review the entire record.

Flieger, supra.

As in State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 161, (Utah 1989),
dissent of Justice Stewart, "this is a classically appropriate
case for application of the manifest error doctrine."
trials

were

in

themselves

wholly

and

totally

Both
error,

constitutional error. The definitional statements of Justice
Stewart in his dissent may be looked to by those justices
interested in imparting justice in this case.
Conclusion:

Defendant/appellant
6

requests that this

matter be remanded to the trial court with directions to
dismiss the prosecution for no probable cause; there was no
security

[investment contract] present in the transactions

described in the evidence and testimony in the second trial;
the presence of a security, the one specified in the charging
documents, is a necessary element to be proved in a securities
violation criminal case.
Plaintiff/appellee's answering brief is not grounded in
fact, not warranted by existing law, and not based on a good
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law, was
interposed for the purpose of delay, to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, and to gain time that will
only benefit plaintiff/appellee; and therefore, defendant/
appellant requests an award of sanctions of at least $5000.00
against the State of Utah to be paid by the Attorney General.
DATED April 14, 1997.
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